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SECURITIES LAW IN THE NEW
MILLENNIUM
JOHN S. D'ALIMONTE
MARY C. CARTY
THOMAS FINKELSTEINt

Remarkable changes have occurred in the capital markets
and capital raising process since the passage of the Securities Act
of 1933,1 (the "1933 Act"), and the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934,2 (the "1934 Act" and, together with the 1933 Act, the
"Securities Acts"). Perhaps the most striking changes have been
the recent, unprecedented rise in the use and impact of modern
technology by investors and issuers, the escalation in speed and
volume of capital raising, and the increasing globalization of the
markets. Over the years, the primary responses to changes have
been piecemeal revisions to either or both of the Securities Acts.
Proposals designed to revamp the Securities Acts, particularly the
1933 Act, have been put forward from time to time with, in some
instances, attendant hearings and voluminous documentation.
None, however, have resulted in the sort of wholesale changes
that many believe, and have proposed, are necessary.
The most recent attempt to make changes was the ill-fated
"Aircraft Carrier"3 launched by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "SEC") in November 1998. The SEC removed
the "Aircraft Carrier" from consideration, at least in its current
form, due to the negative responses of attorneys and the securities
industry.4 Despite the urgent need to modernize securities
t The authors are colleagues at Willkie Farr & Gallagher, New York, NY. All
are graduates of St. John's University School of Law: John S. D'Alimonte (J.D.,
1968); Mary C. Carty (J.D., 1998); and Thomas Finkelstein (J.D., 1998).
1 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2001).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2001).
3 Regulation of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-7606A,
[1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,108, at 81,461-3 (Nov. 13,
1998) [hereinafter the Aircraft Carrier].
4 The comment period for the Aircraft Carrier ended on June 30, 1999. See

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.75:49

regulations that were designed for the capital markets of seventy
years ago, ideally in the form of a paradigmatic statutory shift,
there is currently no proposal from the SEC that would result in
such legislative changes.
What regulatory changes can we
nevertheless expect (or hope) to see in the next few years that will
adapt the federal securities regulatory scheme to the everchanging capital markets?
This article is divided into three parts. Part I contains a brief
overview of the history of the events which gave rise to the
enactment of the 1933 Act, and subsequent attempts by the SEC
to respond to later changes in the capital markets. Part II
discusses recent and dramatic transformations in those markets.
It focuses on changes in capital formation, including types of
securities and financing techniques, the increased frequency and
speed at which offerings are made in the capital markets, and the
rise in the number of institutional investors actively participating
in the capital markets. It details the advances in information
technology leading to the availability of greater amounts of
investor information, securities offerings on the Internet, the
international scope of companies and economic activity that has
led to increased globalization, and the need for more consistency
in disclosure across national borders. Part III makes some
modest predictions about what changes in federal securities
regulations we may see in the near future.
The issues
surrounding modernization of the Securities Acts are complex and
numerous. This article is not intended to examine all the issues
or offer a forum for anything more than a selective discussion.

HAROLD

S.

BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, EMERGING TRENDS IN SECURITIES

§ 1.32, at 87-88 (1999-2000 ed. 1999). By that time, the SEC had received
substantial negative comments on the securities offering portion of the Aircraft
Carrier from a number of sources, including the Securities Industry Association
and The Association of the Bar of the City of New York. Id. (noting the concerns
of the securities industry in regard to the Aircraft Carrier). Both organizations
recommended discarding the securities offering portion of the Aircraft Carrier.
Id. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York also recommended
replacing the Aircraft Carrier with a company-based registration model. Id. The
concept of a company-based registration model is described in Part I of this
article. The Aircraft Carrier has been effectively withdrawn from consideration
in its current form. See Amy L. Goodman, It's Past Time to Rethink the Securities
Act of 1933, INSIGHTS, July, 2000, at 2.
LAW
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I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A.

The Enactment of the SecuritiesAct of 1933

The principal impetus for the drafting and enactment of the
1933 Act 5 was the stock market crash of 1929 and the concomitant
economic depression and securities sales abuses occurring at that
time. 6 The 1929 stock market crash resulted in a two and a halfyear loss of over eighty percent of the total value of all stocks
listed on the New York Stock Exchange.7 It was believed that
investor fraud was one of the main causes of the crash. Caught
up in a heady period of booming prosperity and without the
protection of federal disclosure requirements, investors during the
1920s purchased securities with little knowledge about the nature
of the securities or the companies issuing them. This willingness
5 The 1933 Act regulates the "public offering" of securities by prohibiting the
offer or sale of a security unless a specific exemption is available or a registration
statement is in effect and a prospectus containing certain prescribed information
has been delivered to investors. The 1933 Act provides for the registration of
securities and the disclosure of information to the public in connection with the
public offering. The cornerstone of the 1933 Act is section 5. Securities Act of
1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2001). Section 5(c) prohibits securities offers made
prior to the filing with the SEC of a registration statement, unless there is an
exemption available. Id. § 5(c). The information that must be included in the
registration statement is prescribed by the SEC, including the information in the
prospectus, which is the primary marketing document and forms part of the
registration statement. A preliminary prospectus (generally referred to as a "red
herring" prospectus must accompany any offers to prospective investors. Sales
may not be made until the SEC declares the registration statement effective, and
prior to each sale the offeree must receive the final prospectus. The 1933 Act
provides for civil and criminal liability for the issuer and for certain other parties
involved in the preparation of the registration statement for any material
misstatements and omissions made in the registration statement. Id. § 11; see
also 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (creating liability for false statements in a registration
statement). There are several registration exemptions available which, although
broadened over the years, remain generally narrow. For an account of how a
small start-up company at the turn of the century might have fared in its
attempt to raise capital and fall under one of three exemptions had the
Securities Acts then been in existence, see Stuart R. Cohn, Essay, The Impact of
Securities Laws on Developing Companies: Would the Wright Brothers Have
Gotten off the Ground?, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 315, 315 (1999).
6 Prior to the enactment of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, there had been a
series of regulatory enactments by various states, and regulation of securities
offerings and brokers in Great Britain. For a history of the events leading up to
these earlier legislative enactments, see Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
SEcuRiTIEs REGULATION 3-9, 31-43 (1998).
7 See id. at 167.
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of investors to throw caution to the wind in their quest for
handsome profits brought out the worst in human nature. Highly
questionable enterprises and securities with little more behind
them than the paper they were printed on were marketed with
relative ease.
State securities regulations were enacted in
response to these abuses, but such regulations could not reach
across state lines.8 The crash of the market in 1929 highlighted
the need for a securities regulation system at the federal level and
led to congressional hearings in 1933 that examined the securities
industry and the abuses that were rampant.9
In his 1932
presidential campaign, Franklin Delano Roosevelt promised to
enact federal securities legislation aimed at preventing such
abuses. 10 One of his first acts as President was to send a message
to Congress urging the passage of federal securities legislation."
The original draft of the 1933 Act, submitted to Congress in
March 1933,12 was slanted toward merit regulation, e.g., it was
designed to give the government the power to "pass upon the
13
merits of securities offerings and to prevent unworthy offerings."
This draft was similar to the state securities laws which had been
enacted over the previous two decades and which allowed state
regulators to review securities offerings for their fairness.' 4 There
was considerable debate, however, over whether the federal
securities laws should be merit regulation or regulation requiring
adequate disclosure. President Roosevelt preferred legislation
that would give the government the power to require disclosure
rather than legislation that would provide for a merit-based
evaluation of the issuer or the securities being offered. 15 In April
8 See Michael McDonough, Death in One Act: The Case for Company
Registration,24 PEPP. L. REV. 563, 566 (1997).
9 See S. Res. 84, 72d Cong. (1932) (introducing a resolution to have the
Senate's Banking and Currency Committee investigate securities abuses).
10 See Laylin K. James, Why the Federal Securities Act Was Passed, 13
CONG. DIG. 130, 131 (1934).
11 See S. REP. No. 73-47, at 6-7 (1933); H.R. REP No. 73-85, at 1-2 (1933).
12 See James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933,
28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 30 (1959).
13 Larry D. Soderquist, Approaching Securities Law, in 1 UNDERSTANDING
THE SECURITIES LAws 1998, 9 (3d ed., Prac. L. Inst. 1998) [hereinafter
UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS].
14 See James, supra note 10, at 130-32 (explaining the impetus of the
Federal Securities Act).
15 President Roosevelt noted in his message to Congress:
Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not take any
action which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that
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1933, a completely new version of the 1933 Act was drafted
16
under the aegis of Felix Frankfurter.
B. The Securities and Exchange Act of 193417
Although the 1933 Act required detailed disclosure of
information about the issuer and securities offered to the public, it
did not regulate sales that were not made in a "public offering,"
e.g., private sales transactions or market sales.'8 Nor did the
1933 Act contain provisions for updating information on
companies whose securities were already publicly traded. 9 The
1933 Act was aimed at disclosure that would inform an investor
about an investment in a public offering, but was not aimed at
providing future or ongoing information about the issuer. Once
the public offering was complete, the 1933 Act required no further
disclosure, despite the fact that the security would continue to be
actively traded in the public marketplace on a stock exchange.
The original statutory enactment of the 1934 Act attempted
to complete the regulatory scheme by requiring that no SECregistered broker-dealer could trade a security on a national
securities exchange (the then-predominant marketplace) unless
20
that class of securities had been registered under the 1934 Act.
newly issued securities are sound in the sense that their value will be
maintained or that the properties which they represent will earn
profit.
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of

new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied
by full publicity and information, and that no essentially important
element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public.
Landis, supra note 13, at 30, citing H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 1-2 (1933).
16 See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
CorporateSocial Transparency,112 HARV. L. REV. 1199, 1213 (1999).
17 The 1934 Act established the Securities and Exchange Commission and,
among other things, mandated the registration of securities before they could be
traded on a national securities exchange or, in some instances, over-the-counter.
The 1934 Act also required the registration of the national securities exchanges
and broker-dealers with the SEC. Thus, the 1934 Act primarily regulates
securities trading after the issuer has effected the original issuance See John S.
D'Alimonte & Eugene J. Park, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in 2
UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWs, supra note 13, 1072 PRAc. L. INST./CORP.
L. & PRAc. 339. The 1934 Act extends farther than the 1933 Act regulating,
among other things, proxy solicitations and tender offers. McDonough, supra
note 8, at 580.
18 See Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(2) (2001).
19 See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 3.01, at 57
(2001 ed.).
20 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 12, 48 Stat. 881,
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Once a class of securities is registered under the 1934 Act, 21 the
issuer must periodically file reports with the SEC containing
specified information designed to keep the publicly available
22
information about the issuer current.
It has been suggested that if the 1934 Act had been enacted
before the 1933 Act, our system of federal securities regulation
might look quite different today. 23 In particular, such a reversal
might well have resulted in a scheme based on a one-time
registration of an issuer with on-going public disclosure
(sometimes referred to as a "company registration model"), rather
than event-related disclosure, as is required by the 1933 Act. In a
company-based registration model, upon issuing securities to the
public for the first time the issuer would be required to register
with the SEC by filing a full disclosure document and would
thereafter enter into a regimen of ongoing disclosure (similar to
the periodic reporting requirements of the 1934 Act). This would
make available to all investors and prospective investors the
information adequate to enable them to make buy, hold, and sell
decisions about those securities. The initial establishment of such
a system would have reduced the regulatory primacy of-or even
eliminated almost entirely-the registration statement, because
most of the information investors and prospective investors need
24
would already be publicly available.

892 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1999)) As the U.S. securities
markets shifted from exchanges based almost entirely on national stock
exchanges to over-the-counter markets, it became necessary to expand the reach
of federal securities regulation. Id. The 1964 amendments to the 1934 Act
required, among other things, that any company with more than $1 million
(subsequently raised to $10 million under Rule 12g-1, pursuant to the SEC's
rule-making authority) in total assets register any class of equity securities for
which there are more than 500 shareholders of record. Securities Acts
Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565, 566-67 (1964).
21 The statutory amendments of 1964 also required, pursuant to section
15(d) of the 1934 Act, that a company with securities registered under the 1933
Act file periodic reports under the 1934 Act. Id. at 574.
22 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 13, 48 Stat. 881,
894-95 (1934). Registration under the 1933 Act is event-based, e.g., it relates
only to a particular transaction; registration under the 1934 Act relates to a onetime registration of a class of securities and does not require additional
registrations upon additional issuances. See Milton H. Cohen, Truth in Securities
Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1341 (1966).
23 See Cohen, supra note 22, at 1341-42.
24 See id. at 1357.
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C. The SEC "SpecialStudy"
It became evident to both frustrated securities law
professors2 and corporate attorneys alike, that the disclosure
requirements of the Securities Acts were at times overlapping,
inconsistent, and, in some instances, there were gaps. In 1963,
26
the SEC commissioned a "Special Study of Securities Markets"
to study the Securities Acts, recommend methods of integrating
the disclosure requirements, eliminating overlaps, and closing
gaps. In recognition of the theoretical primacy of the 1934 Act,
one of the main recommendations made by the Special Study was
a system of abbreviated disclosure for registered public offerings
in the form of 'short form' registration statements for those
issuers who were already subject to the reporting requirements of
the 1934 Act.2 7 The proposals of the Special Study, along with an
influential article by Milton Cohen who directed the Special Study
and suggested that the continuous disclosure system of the 1934
Act should be emphasized over the one-time registration
statement of the 1933 Act,28 led to the proposed Federal Securities
Code.
D. The FederalSecurities Code and Subsequent Amendments to
the 1933 and 1934 Acts
The preparation of the proposed Federal Securities Code was
a monumental undertaking that occupied more than eight years
of study and drafting. It was a massive attempt to integrate all of
the federal laws relating to securities, financing and capital
markets into one code. The primary tasks were to streamline the
various federal securities laws, including the Securities Acts, and
29
eliminate duplicate regulations.
One key component of the Federal Securities Code provided
for company-based, rather than offering or transaction-based
registration. The drafters recognized that "[a] great deal of the
needless complexity, as well as a major loss of efficiency in the
25 See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 281.
26 SEC, Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 88-95
PT. 1, at 482 (1st Sess. 1963) [hereinafter the Special Study].
27 See id. at 595.
28 See Cohen, supra note 22, at 1381.
29 1 FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE vii-viii (Am. L. Inst. 1980). The Federal
Securities Code was also intended to replace many administrative regulations
and court decisions with statutory enactments. Id. at xix.
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regulatory system, is caused by the archaic centrality of section 5,
the registration provision of the Securities Act of 1933."30
Consequently, the Federal Securities Code mandated companybased registration for any company having at least $1 million in
assets and an aggregate of 500 holders of all its securities. Only
companies registered under the Federal Securities Code could
have their securities listed on either a national securities
exchange or NASDAQ. A registered company would be subject to
periodic disclosure requirements similar to those of the 1934 Act.
Thus, registration of companies would replace registration of
securities.
When a registered company sought to issue securities, it
would be required to file an offering statement instead of the
present 1933 Act registration statement. The offering statement 3 l
was to include a prospectus and "whatever information, financial
statements, material contracts, and other documents the
Commission specifies by rule."32 The amount of disclosure
required in the offering statement would vary depending upon
whether the registered company had been registered under the
Federal Securities Code, e.g., subject to periodic disclosure
requirements, for a period of at least one year. 33 After revisions
recommended by the SEC, the Federal Securities Code was
completed in 1980. Ultimately, it faded from view as the level of
support from the SEC and other sources was inadequate to
overcome Congress's disinclination to overthrow a system of
regulation, which, despite its sporadic inefficiencies, had proven
34
to be relatively effective for over forty years.
Many of the concepts contained in the Federal Securities
Code can be found in subsequent amendments to the Act, as well
as in the rules and regulations thereunder, resulting in the
development of the integrated disclosure system. Regulation SId. at xix-xx.
See id. at xxviii. If a company that wished to issue securities had not yet
registered as a company, it would simultaneously file a company-based
registration and an offering document. Id.
32 Id. at 244.
33 Id. at 261-62.
34 See McDonough, supra note 8, at 587. Louis Loss, the Reporter for the
Federal Securities Code, maintained that certain legislative amendments have
used the Federal Securities Code as a model and that the Federal Securities
Code has been cited by courts almost in the same manner as a restatement of the
law. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 287.
30

31
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K,35 adopted under amendments enacted in 1977,36 provides for
the "integrated disclosure" of certain requirements in a
centralized and standardized format under both the Securities
Acts. The SEC's Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation
and Regulatory Processes called the development of this
integrated disclosure system the "precursor" to the development of
a company-based registration model. 37 Additional regulatory
changes enacted by the SEC 38 in 1982 created a three-tiered

registration system.39 This system allowed certain registrants to
use 'short form' registration statements utilizing "incorporation by
reference" of some of the registrant's 1934 Act reports into their
1933 Act registration statements. The 1982 amendments came
even closer to recognizing the importance and greater
effectiveness of the 1934 Act, but continued the dual reporting
35 17 C.F.R. § 229.1 (2000).
36 Although the long-simmering Federal Securities Code was the impetus for
the development of Regulation S-K, the immediate triggers were the report of
the 'Wheat Committee'. See SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS, A REAPPRAISAL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 SECURITIES ACT 55-62, 267-296

(La Salle St. Press, 1969);

ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, 95TH
CONG., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMmISSION (Comm. Print 1977). As with earlier and

later reports and recommendations, the inefficiencies of dual reporting systems
and a preference to emphasize the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act were
recognized.
37 Report of the Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and
Regulatory Processes, [1996-97 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,834, at 88,404 (July 24, 1996) [hereinafter Wallman Commission].
38 One of the reasons why the present regulatory system operates
inefficiently vis-&-vis the present capital markets is that for the most part, those
changes that have been introduced have been enacted via regulatory changes by
the SEC, rather than statutory enactments by Congress. Thus, the present
system has grafted onto the original Securities Acts (with a few statutory
amendments) a series of piecemeal regulatory revisions, each of which was an
attempt to address a need that was viewed as compelling at the particular time.
What is needed presently is a new legislative enactment by Congress that would
repeal the Securities Acts and replace them with modem legislation tailored to
the needs of the twenty-first century. Since this seems highly unlikely to occur
anytime soon, this article in Part II suggests some regulatory and rule revisions
that would allow the present statutory and regulatory system to better respond
to present-day needs.
39 Issuers may use forms S-1, S-2 or S-3 to register securities, depending
upon certain eligibility requirements. This system allows certain registrants who
have been subject to the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act for certain
periods of time and had filed their reports in a timely fashion to use 'short form'
registration statements utilizing "incorporation by reference" of certain of the
registrant's 1934 Act reports into the registrant's 1933 Act registration
statements.
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system. Ultimately, the concept of shelf registration of securities,
discussed later in this article, developed from the integrated
40
disclosure system and integration by reference.
E.

The Task Force on DisclosureSimplification and the Advisory
Committee on CapitalFormationand Regulatory Processes

In 1995, the SEC organized the Task Force on Disclosure
Simplification (the "Task Force") 41 and the Advisory Committee
on Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes (frequently
referred to as the "Wallman Commission" after its chair,
Commissioner Steven M. H. Wallman). The primary aims of the
Task Force were to identify ways to simplify disclosure
requirements and increase the efficiency of the registration
process. 42 The Wallman Commission's goal was to analyze the
capital markets in an attempt to identify ways to make the
process of securities registration more responsive to the needs of
the capital markets. 43
In 1996 the Task Force and the
Commission issued reports that called for significant changes in
securities registration requirements.
The Wallman Commission, echoing the recommendations of
Professor Cohen nearly two decades earlier, advocated a
transition to a company-based registration model that focused on
periodic filings by issuers as the primary source of information for
investors.
The Task Force reviewed the forms and rules related to
capital-raising transactions, the periodic reporting requirements
of the 1934 Act, proxy solicitations, and tender offers and
beneficial ownership reporting under the Williams Act.
It
recommended the elimination of a number of rules and forms it
considered duplicative and/or no longer necessary, 44 and endorsed
40

See McDonough, supranote 8, at 564.

41 SEC, Report of the Task Force on Disclosure Simplification (1996),

available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/smpl.htm [hereinafter Task Force
Report].
42 See id. at 9.
43 See Wallman Commission, supra note 37, at 88, 404.
44 The Task Force's recommendations resulted in a series of releases by the
SEC proposing the elimination of certain forms and rules under the Securities
Acts, which were duplicative or served no useful purpose; most of these forms
and rules were ultimately eliminated. See John D'Alimonte, Emily Rixinger &
Alec C. Sherod, Streamliningthe Task Force Report on Disclosure Simplification:
A Summary of the Task Force Proposals and Securities and Exchange
Commission Responses, 963 PRAc. L. INST./CoRP L. & PRAc. 47, 48 (1996).
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the proposed company-based registration model then under
consideration by the Wallman Commission. 45 The Task Force also
made the following recommendations: liberalization of the
46
requirements for and availability of shelf registration;
modification of the prospectus delivery requirement under the
1933 Act to permit "seasoned issuers"47 offering common stock,
not in an initial public offering, to utilize full incorporation by
reference into a confirmation of sale, rather than requiring
delivery of a prospectus, 48 and; development of the use of "Plain
English" in registration statements and other documents
49
regulated by the Securities Acts.
The Wallman Commission recommended a company-based
registration model rather than a transaction-based model for
It called company-based registration the
seasoned issuers. 50
"logical culmination" of the development "away from the
transaction-based framework for the registration of securities,"
and noted:
[TIransactional concepts still underlying the current scheme
for registration of securities continue to impose unnecessary
costs and restrictions on issuer access to capital. Perhaps
more importantly, in many instances the transactional
system also serves as an impediment to full and timely
disclosure to investors and the markets, and the realization
of the full potential for investor protection provided by the
51
1933 Act.
The Wallman Commission claimed the following advantages
would result from company-based registration: (i) increased speed
and flexibility of access to the capital markets; (ii) decreased
concerns related to "gun-jumping," restricted securities, and
integration, (of separate offerings, which can destroy a
45 See Task Force Report, supra note 41, at 46.

See id. at 48-54.
As defined by the Wallman Commission, "seasoned issuers" would be
issuers which had timely filed all required periodic reports for a certain length of
time, were listed on a national securities exchange or on NASDAQ's National
Market System and had at least $75 million of outstanding securities of the class
being registered held by nonaffiliates. See Wallman Commission, supra note 37,
46

47

at 88,404-05.

48 See Task Force Report, supra note 41, at 43; see also Wallman
Commission, supranote 37, 88,404.
49 See Wallman Commission supra note 37, at 88,405.
50 See Wallman Commission, supranote 37, at 88,404-05.
51 Id. at 88,404.
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registration exemption), as these concepts related to the
distinction between public and private offerings, a concept which
would either be eliminated or greatly diminished under the
company-based registration model; and (iii) lower costs of raising
capital, which would ultimately benefit shareholders. 52 Under the
proposed model, a company would file a registration statement to
provide company-related disclosure and indicate its intent to issue
securities from time to time, thereby effectuating a generic
registration of its securities. Once registered, a company wishing
to issue securities would file certain types of disclosure (to the
extent such disclosure was not already publicly available)
dependent upon the type of security being offered. If a company
filed its required periodic reports, the SEC would no longer review
offering documents except for certain "nonroutine" and
"extraordinary" transactions. 53 Thus, there would generally be no
waiting period while the SEC reviewed the registration
statement. Initial public offerings, however, would not be covered
54
by the company-based registration model.
F.

The Aircraft CarrierRelease

In July 1996, the SEC issued a release requesting comments
on ways to improve the capital formation process.5 5 To aid the
SEC, Congress passed the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996. This act gave the SEC broad discretion
in regulating the securities markets. As a result of its expanded
exemptive authority and in response to the proposals of the
Wallman Commission and the Task Force, the SEC began to
examine different approaches to improve the securities markets
and the capital formation process.5 6
The SEC's inquiry
culminated in a 1998 release that was so extensive and wide
ranging it was dubbed the "Aircraft Carrier."57
52

See id.

53 See id.
54 See id.

55 See Gerald S. Blackman, The SEC's Aircraft Carrier- Is It Seaworthy? A
Summary and Critique, 1109 PRAc. L. INST./J. CORP. L. & PRAc. 191, 193.
56 See id at 193-94.
57 See Linda C. Quinn & Ottilie L. Jarmel, Publicity Considerations for
Corporate Issuers: Getting the Message Across Under the Federal Securities
Laws "Aircraft Carrier" Release Annotation, in SECURITIES OFFERINGS: WHAT
ISSUERS NEED TO KNOw Now, 1174 PRAC L. INST./CORP. L. & PRAc. 69, 121 n.1
(April 27, 2000) [hereinafter SECURITIES OFFERINGS] (noting that the Aircraft
Carrier was so named due to its "magnitude").
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The Aircraft Carrier consisted of a proposed overhaul of the
current securities offering regime in several key areas, including
registration system changes, revisions of regulations governing
communications at the time of securities offerings, elimination of
final prospectus delivery requirements, defining the appropriate
scope of underwriter due diligence, expanding the contents of
periodic reports under the 1934 Act, and guidelines for the
integration of private and public offerings. The most dramatic
change was the proposed elimination of the eight forms currently
used in public offerings and their replacement with three forms.
The three new forms, titled Forms A, B, and C, would have been
used in offerings by smaller unseasoned companies and all initial
public offerings, for offerings by large seasoned companies, and for
mergers and acquisitions, respectively.
Although the securities offering proposals of the Aircraft
Carrier represented a striking change from the current regime,
they did not constitute a change to a company-based registration
model similar to the one recommended by the Wallman
Commission.58 The Aircraft Carrier attempted to build upon the
Securities Acts and institute change through the SEC's
rulemaking powers.
The Aircraft Carrier proposals would
continue to require that every non-exempt offering be registered
under the 1933 Act. Within the framework of the Securities Acts
the Aircraft Carrier did, however, attempt to move toward a
system which emphasized the importance of ongoing company
disclosure through periodic 1934 Act filings, over the eventoriented transactional disclosure of the registration statement
required by the 1933 Act.
The proposed Form A would have contained most of the
information currently required to be included in Form S-1. A
company typically uses form S-1 when no other form is authorized
for use.
Certain company information could have been
incorporated by reference by seasoned issuers.5 9
58 See BLOOMENTHAL & WOOLF, supra note 4, § 1.04, at 2; see also supra note
38 and accompanying text (discussing piecemeal regulatory changes instituted
by the SEC, in response to changes in the capital markets, as opposed to the
wholesale legislative statutory revisions that would most effectively deal with
these changes).
59 The definition of a "seasoned issuer" for purposes of Form A included
issuers who had a two-year 1934 Act reporting history and either a public float of
at least $75 million or had filed at least two annual reports. See BLOOMENTHAL &
WOOLF, supra note 4, § 1.14, at 31.
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Form B represented the SEC's most radical departure from
the current securities offering regime. Under Form B, large
and/or well-followed seasoned issuers 60 could have effected
offerings by means of a prospectus containing certain offering
information, (comparable to, but less than what is presently
required under the 1933 Act), incorporation by reference of 1934
Act reports, and a prospectus term sheet. The SEC would not
have reviewed a Form B registration statement prior to
effectiveness (although it would have been screened by the SEC to
determine if the registrant was eligible to use Form B). 61 The
issuer could file a Form B registration statement and then
determine when it was to become effective. 62 Fees would be paid
not upon filing, but upon first sale of the securities. Additionally,
marketing of the securities-making offers to sell and soliciting
offers to buy-could begin as determined by the issuer and before
filing the registration statement. Thus, Form B represented an
attempt to allow certain issuers increased flexibility in
determining when to issue their securities, but did not represent
the company-based registration model envisioned by the Wallman
Commission, as it still required the provision of considerable
information in the registration statement. Its advantage over the
current system is that it would have allowed an eligible issuer to
63
quickly issue securities in response to market conditions.
Many commentators expressed grave concerns about the
Aircraft Carrier. In particular, the Aircraft Carrier proposed to
impose section 11 liability for material misstatements and
omissions in an issuer's 1934 Act reports. Absent a safe harbor,
60 For purposes of Form B, a "seasoned issuer" included those issuers who
have a one year 1934 Act reporting history and had filed at least one annual
report. A large and/or well-followed issuer had a public float of $75 million and a
$1 million average daily trading volume or a $250 million public float. See id. §
1.02, at 3-4. The criteria to use Form B, although similar to the present S-3
criteria, were more stringent and therefore a number of companies who
presently meet S-3 eligibility criteria would not meet Form B criteria. See id.
§1.32, at 90.
61 Companies that filed on Form A and met certain eligibility criteria would
also not have their forms reviewed. See Aircraft Carrier, supra note 3, at 81,51719.
62 See id. at 121; see also Blackman, supra note 55, at 195.
63 The SEC believed that institution of Form B would have effectively
eliminated the need for a shelf registration for most types of securities issuances,
as it would have provided similar flexibility and the added advantage of payment
of fees at the time of sale instead of at filing. See Blackman, supra note 55, at
196.
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this would have made the registrant and some of its directors and
officers strictly liable. Additionally, a number of companies that
are currently able to file on S-3 would not have been eligible to file
on the roughly equivalent Form B. 64 Based on all the criticisms
received, the Aircraft Carrier was formally withdrawn by the
65

SEC.

II. CHARACTERISTICS OF TODAY'S CAPITAL MARKETS

Three major characteristics of today's capital markets
demonstrate the utility and importance of a securities offering
scheme patterned on a company-based registration model: (i) the
structure and composition of today's capital markets, in
particular, the increasing variations in the types of securities
offered and the speed with which offerings are made; (ii)
developments in information technology and the Internet; and (iii)
globalization. This portion of this article will discuss each of these
characteristics and describe how it is affected by the current
offering-based securities regime and whether a company-based or
closely analogous registration model for offerings would affect the
66
status quo.

A.

The Structure and Composition of the CapitalMarkets

1.

The Offering-Based Registration Model of the 1933 Act
Cannot Keep Pace with the Wide Variety of Securities Issued
in Today's Capital Markets

The capital markets of today are significantly different from
those that existed when the Securities Acts were promulgated.
Today's markets are populated by a large variety of financial
instruments and transactions.
New variations on spin-offs,
hybrid offerings, various kinds of exchange offers, convertible and

64 See BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 4, § 1.32, at 90. Two of the
primary commentators were the Securities Industry Association and The
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, both of whom provided negative
comment. Id. at 87-91.
65 Some of the comments went so far as to recommend rejecting all Aircraft
Carrier proposals. See supra note 4 (discussing the SEC's withdrawal of the
Aircraft Carrier).
66 As discussed infra, an expanded shelf registration system can provide
many of the advantages of a company-based registration model and, in many
ways, resembles a company-based registration model.
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preferred debt issuances and other means of raising capital are
constantly being invented. 67 Since the SEC and Congress move
slowly in implementing changes in securities regulation and
legislation, proposed laws or regulations relating to new types of
securities can be superseded by still newer forms of capitalraising, even as proposals are approved.
An offering-based
registration model presents a significant problem, as the SEC and
Congress are constantly playing the game of "catch-up" with the
68
capital markets.
In a company-based registration system, the regulation
focuses primarily on the terms of a particular offering. At the
time of an offering, regulators would focus less on the issuer and
more on the particular offering. Adequate disclosure about the
issuer is readily available through the issuer's periodic filings. By
placing the focus of its inquiry on the particular offering rather
than the particular issuer, the regulatory agency charged with
overseeing capital formation would achieve two desirable ends.
First, the "outpacing" problem described in the preceding
paragraph is minimized since the object of review is the offering
and not the company. Second, costs associated with offerings
should be significantly reduced. 69 By allowing issuers to simply
file periodic reports about their status and operations, and then
conduct offerings
pursuant to
abbreviated registration
statements, issuers could save money that would otherwise be
spent on accounting fees, legal fees, printing costs and state and
federal filing fees. 70 In fact, the aggregation of these costs can
sometimes be an insurmountable hurdle for smaller companies
71
seeking access to capital markets.

67 See McDonough, supra note 8, at 604-09 (indicating that investors have
abandoned public offerings under the 1933 Act in favor of new and developing
alternative methods of raising capital).
68 As discussed in section III of this article, one advantage of the universal
shelf registration system is that it allows an issuer to register a wide variety of
securities. Expansion of the use of a universal shelf registration system would
allow issuers more flexibility in their attempts to keep pace with the capital
markets.
69 In the early 1990s the costs of compliance in an initial public offering
represented eleven percent of the total proceeds from the offering. See
McDonough, supra note 8, at 595.
70 See id. at 595 n.250.
71 See generally Joseph Kershenbaum, Securities Offerings Online by Small
Nonpublic Businesses, 25 VT. BARJ. 19 (Sept. 1999).
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The Rise of the Institutional Investor in the Capital Markets
May Make the 1933 Act's Offering-Based Focus Unnecessary

When the Securities Acts were first promulgated, their aim
was to protect financially unsophisticated individuals from those
trying to sell them pieces of "blue sky."72 This was also the aim of
many state securities laws, dubbed "Blue Sky Laws." 73 Larger,
sophisticated institutional investors including banks, pension
funds, mutual funds and casualty insurance companies, however,
dominate today's capital markets. 74
In 1990, institutional
investors accounted for almost fifty-four percent of all equity
holdings in the United States capital markets, compared with
5
thirty-eight percent in 1981 and twenty-three percent in 1955.7
Additionally, institutional investors currently own a majority of
76
the equity of the fifty largest companies in the United States.
The rise in the number of institutional investors underscores
the problems of the current securities registration regime.
Institutional investors may have a lesser need for the "extra"
protection afforded by the current offering-based model in the
securities laws in part because of their ability to gather and
process information about issuers, and in part because of their
ability to deal with complicated financial issues and transactions
in a short timeframe. This enables issuers and institutional
buyers to effect transactions during market windows and other
periods of investment opportunity. An offering-based registration
process, with the attendant registration statement drafting,
possible SEC review, and prospectus delivery requirements, may
preclude the issuer from effectuating its offering in a manner
consistent with opportunities afforded by the capital markets.7 7 A
company-based registration regime permits issuers to seize
opportunities for raising capital more quickly, particularly in
transactions with institutional investors who have tracked and
monitored the issuer's growth and might not need the extensive
disclosure required by the 1933 Act.
See Cohn, supranote 5, at 323.
Id. at 323 n.19.
74 See McDonough, supra note 8, at 593-94.
75 See id at 593 n.239 (citations omitted).
76 See Joseph Evan Calio & Rafael Xavier Zahralddin, The Securities and
Exchange Commission's 1992 Proxy Amendments: Questions ofAccountability, 14
PACE L. REV. 459, 476 (1994) (stating that, as of 1994, institutional investors
owned over sixty percent of the equity securities in the fifty largest companies).
77 See McDonough, supra note 8, at 595.
72
73
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Modern Markets Demand a Faster Means of Effecting
Offerings and Other Transactions

Notwithstanding the recent slump in initial public offerings,
the capital markets have been moving at increased rates. The
time between inception of business concepts, commencement of
operations, and initial public offerings has become progressively
shorter. Given this ever-shortening time span between inception
and public offering, newer, faster means of effecting capital
raising for emerging companies, as well as for more developed
companies, are needed. While a company-based registration
system could not eliminate the need for a rapidly developing
issuer to file frequently to keep public information about its
business current, it would permit the issuer to do so at times
when it is not pressured to effectuate capital raising.
Furthermore, a company-based registration system would
presumably eliminate the potential delay posed by SEC review of
a registration statement at the time of each offering of securities.
B.

The Internet and the CapitalMarkets
The second characteristic that distinguishes modern capital
markets from capital markets of the past is the extent to which
technological advances have played a part in structuring and
defining the operation of capital markets. In today's markets,
investors have ever-increasing amounts of information about
issuers and businesses from a wide variety of sources. 78 Many
argue that this access enables investors to make investment
decisions on par with decisions made by Wall Street
professionals. 79 This deluge of data, however, underscores the
tension inherent in the 1933 Act between a free flow of
78 See generally Stephen Kundenholdt & Warren Gottlieb, Securities Law
Issues and the Use of Electronic Media in the Capital Market Place, 2 WALL ST.
LAW. 17 (1998). The SEC has recently promulgated Regulation FD (for "fair
disclosure"), which requires issuers to disclose to the public the same
information previously released only to analysts monitoring an issuer's
performance, and sets out a road map for the means by which such disclosure
can be achieved. See 17 C.F.R. § 243 (2001); see also Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716-37 (Aug. 24, 2000) (explaining the
purpose behind and intended effect of Regulation FD).
79 See Securities Fraud on the Internet: Hearings Before the Permanent
Subcomm. On Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
106th Cong. 79-91 (Mar. 22-23, 1999) (testimony of Thomas M. Gardner, founder
of The Motley Fool, Inc.), available at 1999 WL 8085871.
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information on the one hand and the need to protect investors
from fraudulent or manipulative practices by regulating
communications, on the other.
Strict adherence to the current securities offering model
thwarts some of the technological efficiencies offered by the
Internet. Conversely, allowing information to flow unchecked over
the Internet could potentially lead to serious abuses. Generally,
the SEC has taken a cautious pro-technology stance on some of
the issues raised by the advent of the Internet.80 While several
key issues currently under review by the SEC should help clarify
the role of the Internet in the capital markets, other issues
remain unsettled.
1.

The SEC's Interpretation of Prohibited "Offers" Must Be
Revisited in Light of Recent Technological Developments
Questions remain as to the treatment of corporate
communications on a company's web site. Generally, in a
securities offering under the current regime, written offers, except
preliminary prospectuses labeled as such, to potential investors
are prohibited prior to the declaration of effectiveness of a
registration statement by the SEC.81 After effectiveness, offers
must be accompanied or preceded by delivery of a final
prospectus. The SEC interprets the term "offer" very broadly, as
any communication that primes the market for interest in an
offering.8 2 The SEC views material posted on a web site as
written information. Companies could therefore be subject to
significant liability if the website materials could be interpreted
as offering materials and the requirements of the 1933 Act have
not been adhered to.83 To further complicate the issue, hyperlinks
on a company's website that could be construed as promoting the
company's securities, e.g., analyst reports or information about a
company's strategic partners, could also serve as a basis of

80 See Kundenholdt & Gottlieb, supranote 78, at 17.
81 See Cohn, supra note 5, at 327 n.34.
82 See id. at 331 n.47. An offer is defined to include "every attempt or offer to
dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for
value." Id.
83 See Statement of the Commission Regarding Use of Internet Websites to
Offer Securities, Solicit Securities Transactions or Advertise Investment Services
Offshore, Securities Act Release No. 33-7516 (March 23, 1998), available at 1998
WL 128173; see also Quinn & Jarmel, supra note 57, at 110.
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liability.8 4 The SEC should evaluate its position regarding
offering materials on websites and the role such materials play in
the offering of securities. The SEC has indicated an intention to
clarify certain of these issues in the year 2000, but has not yet
issued any releases on the subject.
2.

Revisions of Delivery Requirements to Take Advantage of the
Internet

The SEC has made some revisions to its prospectus delivery
requirements to accommodate the use of the Internet. Generally,
the new SEC electronic delivery guidelines are analogous to
delivery procedures used for traditional paper media.8 5 The
touchstones of the SEC's analysis were: (i) an investor should be
given quantitatively similar notice via electronic means as is
given when paper is used; (ii) an investor should have
qualitatively similar access to the electronically delivered
material as would be the case if the material were mailed to the
investor, e.g., the investor should be able to easily access the
material, retain a copy of the material for later use, and, to the
extent material is delivered through the Internet or other online
medium, such material should be available for review for as long
as the delivery requirement applies; (iii) an investor should, upon
request, be permitted to receive from the issuer paper copies of
the offering materials; and (iv) the person or issuer providing the
offering material by electronic means must demonstrate that the
delivery requirement was satisfied in a qualitatively similar
fashion to a traditional mailing, e.g., an e-mail confirming receipt
of the information, or a hyperlink to a required document such as
86
a prospectus accompanying a free writing.
The current paper delivery requirements create significant
expense for issuers.8 7 Electronic delivery should significantly
reduce the costs of an offering by greatly reducing, if not
See Quinn & Jarmel, supra note 57, at 151.
See id. at 148-49.
86 See id.
87 See Brian Eddy, Internet Road Shows: It's Time to Open the Door for the
Retail Investor, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 867, 876 (2000) (noting that paper-based
distribution is less cost-effective than dissemination through electronic media);
Satu S. Svahn, Note, GreaterInvestor Outreach at the Click of a Mouse: Internet
and Closed-Circuit Road Shows Should Reach Retail Investors, 65 BROOK. L.
REV. 249, 278 (1999) (noting the low costs of Internet delivery as compared with
84

85

paper-based delivery).
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eliminating, the printing and distribution costs of prospectuses. 88
Furthermore, it should save time, as electronic transmission is
nearly instantaneous.
3.

Electronic Road Shows Offer Significant Benefits to Smaller
Businesses that Have Previously Been Excluded from
Participating in the Capital Markets

Another important technological development that has had
an impact on the offering regime is the use of electronic road
shows to arouse interest in an issuer and its securities. In
traditional offerings, issuers and their underwriters travel the
country and meet potential investors, usually institutions or
broker dealers, to describe the issuer and the offering.8 9 Electronic
road shows, whereby the issuer's presentation is made available
over the Internet or a closed circuit television network, are
becoming commonplace. 90
The SEC has approved the use of electronic road shows
conducted under specific guidelines in several no-action letters.
These guidelines include delivery of a preliminary prospectus as
filed with the SEC prior to transmission, providing a "crawl" that
directs potential investors to review the aforementioned
preliminary prospectus and ensures that information presented in
the electronic road show is not inconsistent with the information
in the preliminary prospectus. 9'
The SEC has agreed that
88 See Svahn, supra note 87, at 279 (noting that uploading financial
statements and other disclosures on the Internet is easier and cheaper than the
current paper delivery system); see also Nancy Gondo, Internet May Open Road
Shows to Small Investors, INVESTOR's Bus. DAILY, Dec. 10, 1997 at A9 (stating
that the Internet makes distribution costs "negligible").
89 See Svahn, supra note 87, at 252, 278 (noting the low cost of Internet road
shows and the greater access provided to small investors through Internet road
shows); Eddy, supra note 87, at 868 (stating that traditional methods for
generating potential investor interest involved travelling "from city to city").
90 See Svahn, supra note 87, at 250 n.2; see also Quinn & Jarmel, supra note
57 (noting that the expanding use of electronic media in the securities field
prompted the SEC to allow electronic road shows).
91 To date, six companies have been given approval by the SEC to conduct
road shows over the Internet or through closed-circuit television. The companies
are Private Financial Network, see Private Fin. Network, SEC No-Action Letter,
at 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 406 (Mar. 12, 1997); Net Roadshow, Inc., see Net
Roadshow, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, at 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 864 (Sept. 8,
1997); Bloomberg, L.P., see Bloomberg, L.P., SEC No-Action Letter, at 1997 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 1023 (Dec. 1, 1997); Activate Net Corporation, see Activate Net
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, at 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 766 (Sept. 21, 1999);
Thomson Financial Services, Inc., see Thomson Fin. Svcs., Inc., SEC No-Action
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electronic road shows can be considered distinct from those
conducted over television or radio broadcast, which are considered
to be prohibited "writings," so long as electronic road shows are
conducted over private networks. 92 The rationale behind this
seems to be that the SEC believes that the statutory reference to
broadcasting refers to only broadcasting to an undifferentiated
audience, not the use of similar technology for closed-circuit
broadcasting or other controlled transmissions directed at a
93
limited investor audience.
Subsequent no-action letters addressing electronic road
shows have clarified that Internet road shows are permissible
under certain circumstances. Road show viewers must appreciate
the importance of the prospectus delivered to them, must not have
an unlimited opportunity to view the road show, and they must
not record and redistribute the road show. 94 The most recent noaction letter on the subject of electronic road shows would allow
the issuer to present the road shows to certain retail investors
over the Internet provided: (i) the road show would only be
transmitted after the registration statement is filed and a
preliminary prospectus is distributed; (ii) the investor could click
a button to indicate they would not re-transmit the road show or
make it available to persons who would not otherwise qualify to
view the show; (iii) the preliminary prospectus would be made
available for download and printing with a restrictive legend
stating that the offering is made by a prospectus only; (iv) the
Internet road show is consistent with the prospectus; (v) the
entire road show, together with its question and answer session,
is transmitted; and (v) passwords to view the road show would
only be issued to qualified investors. 95 The SEC has indicated
that it intends to propose rules addressing electronic road shows
some time in 2000.96
Letter, at 1998 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 837 (Sept. 4, 1998); and Charles Schwab &
Co., Inc., see Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, at 1999 WL
1038050 (Nov. 12, 1999).
92 See Private Fin. Network, SEC No-Action Letter, at 1997 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 406 (Mar. 12, 1997).
93 See id. The SEC agreed without discussion to the terms of the no-action
letter that argued that broadcasting contemplated an undifferentiated offering
which was materially distinct from the facts in the no-action letter. See id.
94 See id.
95 See Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 1038050
(Nov. 12, 1999).
96 See Quinn & Jarmel, supra note 57, at 143.
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The SEC's apparently increasing acceptance of Internet road
shows is significant for several reasons. By allowing Internet
road shows to be made available to retail investors, the SEC is
acknowledging the effect of developing technology on the
enfranchisement of retail investors and allowing these investors
to form an opinion and take actions that were previously limited
to institutional investors and Wall Street professionals.9 7 Also,
the cost of an electronic road show can be substantially less than
the cost of a traditional road show.98 As a result, the use of
electronic road shows should make the capital markets accessible
to smaller businesses for which offerings would have otherwise
been cost prohibitive. Provided that underwriters are willing to
commit to such small business offerings, the capital markets could
become an even more fertile breeding ground for new ventures.
Eventually, the broad acceptance of electronic road shows,
together with expansive
electronic prospectus
delivery
requirements, should pave the way for offerings to be conducted
entirely over the Internet with no "paper" involved.
4.

The Rise of Securities Fraud and Manipulation on the
Internet Will Continue to Lead to Increased Enforcement
Efforts by the SEC

As the Internet progressively makes the capital markets
accessible to a broader array of investors and lay individuals, the
potential for abuse will increase.
In response, the SEC has nearly doubled the size of its
Internet surveillance team, the Cyberforce. 99 Currently, the
Cyberforce is not permitted to conduct undercover operations, is
limited to monitoring the content of Internet bulletin boards and
chat rooms, and must reveal its presence and purpose. 10 0 If
97 See Svahn, supra note 87, at 179 (suggesting the benefits of Internet road
shows, including a wider audience, outweigh the disadvantages, such as
expansion of liability).
98 See Nancy Gondo, Internet May Open Road Shows to Small Investors,
INVESTOR's Bus. DAILY, Dec. 10, 1997, at A9 (noting that while typical road
shows can cost up to $150,000, Internet road shows generally cost as little as

$15,000).
99 See Quinn & Jarmel, supra note 57, at 158.
o0 See Electronic Commerce: Levitt Announces Increased Inspections,
Enforcement for Internet Brokerage Firms, 31 BNA SEC. REG. L. REP. 18 (May 7,
1999); see also Joseph J. Celia III and John Reed Stark, SEC Enforcement and
the Internet: Meeting the Challenge of the Next Millennium, 52 Bus. LAW. 815,
835-37 (May 1997) (recognizing that the only restriction is that the Division
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Internet fraud continues to grow, it may be necessary to expand
Cyberforce's mandate to include more extensive investigative
operations.' 0
Further, in recent years the SEC has increased its
commitment to pursuing and prosecuting enforcement actions
relating to violations of the securities laws by way of the Internet.
The SEC has conducted three fraud "sweeps" in part to increase
awareness of the existence of Internet securities fraud.10 2 The
enforcement actions were targeted at individuals and companies
that engaged in illegal touting of stocks that failed to disclose
their affiliation with and compensation by the issuers whose
stocks they touted. Also targeted were companies and individuals
who fraudulently sold unregistered securities and who made false
10 3
representations about investment returns.
It is important to note that the Internet is, at its core, a
communications tool and, as such, can be abused like any other
communications

tool.l0 4

The trail it leaves behind and the

anonymity it offers, however, creates significant advantages for
the SEC in pursuing its enforcement role. 10 5 Thus, the New
Yorker cartoon lampooning the anonymity of the Internet by
showing a dog sitting at a keyboard with a caption that reads "on
the Internet no one knows you're a dog" is applicable to the SEC's
enforcement role in cyberspace as well; in the words of The Motley
Fool, "[Niobody in cyberspace knows you are a securities
06
regulator."'1
C.

Globalization

The third major characteristic of modern capital markets is
the substantial interdependence of the world markets. 1 7 Today's
cannot participate in undercover operations, and before communicating any staff
person must identify themselves and their purpose and comply with a variety of
other due process requirements).
101 See Quinn & Jarmel, supra note 57, at 160 (describing proposed
legislation that would allow the use of state regulatory findings, rather than the
investigation of each charge independently, enabling faster enforcement).
102
103
104
105
106
107

See id. at 159.
See id. at 159-60.
See supra note 79.
See id.
See id.

See Lee E. Michaels & Marc I. Steinberg, Disclosure in Global Securities
Offerings: Analysis of JurisdictionalApproaches, Commonality and Reciprocity,
20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 207, 208 (1999).
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United States capital markets affect and are affected by other
markets throughout the world. This has resulted from, among
other things, the relaxation of foreign exchange controls,
diversification of funding and investment resources by issuers and
investors, floating interest rates, and technological advances in
communication and transportation.1 0 8
In view of this
interdependence, countries have tried and must continue to try to
harmonize and coordinate securities regulations worldwide in
order to facilitate global offerings. 10 9
There have been two significant developments in efforts to
implement a global securities regulation regime. The first has
been referred to as the cooperative approach, whereby a uniform
set of rules and regulations (including a uniform disclosure
document) is promulgated for use by participants in international
capital markets. 110 The second, reciprocity, strives to have one
country accord "full faith and credit" to the regulatory regime of
another country when the second country's securities are sold in
the first country, provided certain minimum thresholds are
met."' Neither of these approaches have had great success in
forming an international consensus on the appropriate standards
112
to govern international offerings of securities.
Most countries with developed securities markets identify two
basic principles, disclosure and registration, as vital components
of a robust capital market. 113 Despite this consensus, ideas
between countries diverge significantly when it comes to defining
these tenets of securities regulation. For example, the standards
of required disclosure vary widely. While disclosure of offering
108

See id.

See id. at 208-09 ("[E]nterprises focus on foreign markets for financing
based on their desire to expand the geographic base of their investors, to meet
certain financing goals which cannot be met within their home countries, and to
create a more international presence for strategic or marketing reasons.").
109

110 Id. at 236.
M1Id.

112 Id. at 265-66; see also Trig R. Smith, Note and Comment: The S.E.C. and
Regulation of ForeignPrivateIssuers:Another Missed Opportunity at Meaningful
Regulatory Change, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 765, 774 (2000) (noting that, while the
E.U. harmonization plan follows the reciprocity model, the SEC has been
reluctant to adopt such an approach beyond its M.J.D.S. plan with Canada).
113 The European Community, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy,
Canada, Mexico, Japan and Australia all have securities regimes based on the
concepts of disclosure and registration of some sort (although generally these
regimes are company-based). See Michaels & Sternberg, supra note 107, at 21036.
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materials and issuer information are required in general, the
specific contents vary from country to country. Some countries
require that the prospectus contain only information about an
issuer, others require that there be data about a particular
offering, still others require that a prospectus contain information
about both the issuer and the proposed securities being offered.
Similarly, the standards governing the scope of disclosure
requirements
vary significantly. 114
Another hurdle to
international uniformity has been concern about accounting
practices. 115
While the International Accounting Standards
Committee ("IASC") has worked to develop international
accounting standards, it remains unclear whether the world's
116
securities regulators will accept its standards.
The goal of the International Organization of Securities
Commissions ("IOSCO") is the unification of international
disclosure standards. It urges the adoption of similar guidelines
internationally and promotes cooperation among its member
countries. Its efforts have met with some resistance because of
the broad range of cultural differences, sovereignty concerns,
differences in market structure, differences in the development
and maturity of markets, and a myriad of other disparities among
its constituent members. 117 To compound the problem, IOSCO
114 See David S. Ruder, Preface, Reconciling U.S. Disclosure Policy with
InternationalAccounting and DisclosureStandards, 17 N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
1, 5 (1996) (stating that the standards imposed by the SEC require much more
disclosure than foreign regulatory standards and "as a result many foreign
issuers do not wish to comply with these different accounting and disclosure
requirements and, therefore, are unwilling to enter the U.S. market").
115 See Michaels & Sternberg, supra note 107, at 242-43. In 1995, IOSCO
and IASC reached an agreement about international accounting practices
whereby IASC would develop the principles and standards and IOSCO would
endeavor to promulgate these practices in all global markets. The United States'
endorsement of these practices was left an unresolved question. Subsequently,
the SEC expressed reservations about the proposed international practices. See
id.
116 See id. at 265 (concluding that thus far "efforts at harmonization have
been challenging" and "largely unsuccessful").
117 See id. at 208-09 (recognizing that consensus among countries regarding
an optimal approach to the international economy because of the wide
divergence in their economies is difficult to obtain); see also Todd A. Sulger,
Comment, Harmonization of Securities Market Regulations in the European
Union: Is the Price Tag Too High?, 29 CAL W. INT'L L.J. 221, 236 (stating that
standards developed by IOSCO "need to be flexible enough to support variations
resulting from peculiarities in legal, tax, and regulatory structure; differing
economic environments; and circumstances unique to specific countries").
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lacks the power to implement policies that would govern the
various regulators and often has difficulty gaining their
Notwithstanding the
unanimous support on positions."i 8
foregoing, IOSCO has attempted to help its member countries
develop compatible regulations affecting the Internet. Although
the IOSCO's recommendations are not enforceable against any
particular country, they are likely to be highly influential in the
development of any international securities regulation.
While it seems clear that there is a strong desire for an
international accounting and disclosure regime, it is difficult to
predict when such a regime will be established. Until such time,
international issuers will continue to walk through a maze of
securities regulations in each of the countries they sell their
securities.
III. THE NEXT FIVE YEARS
A.

Expanded Use of Universal Shelf Registration

It is almost certain that the company-based registration
model, recommended by the Wallman Commission and the Task
Force report, will not become a reality within the near future.
Although such a system offers advantages in dealing with today's
capital markets by providing the requisite speed and flexibility
that issuers need while providing investors with necessary
information, it is doubtful that the legislature will develop the
necessary fortitude to enact such far-reaching statutory changes.
The Aircraft Carrier, which was not a true company-based
registration model but did attempt to offer greater flexibility and
speed of offering for a broader universe of issuers, was formally
withdrawn by the SEC with the expressed intention not to
reintroduce it in a similar form. Given the unlikelihood of any
far-reaching regulatory or statutory enactments by the SEC or
Congress within the next few years, the needs of today's capital
markets must be met by working within the current system.
Expanded use of the shelf registration process is an alternative
way to meet many of the needs of today's capital markets. 119
118 See Michaels & Sternberg, supra note 107, at 239.
119 The Task Force also recommended expanding the availability of the

universal shelf registration system. See Task Force Report, supra note 41, at 4854. The SEC believed that the introduction of the Aircraft Carrier proposals
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Although the universal shelf registration system is regulated
under the 1933 Act and does not fit within the parameters of a
company-based registration model, it is a quicker and more
efficient way for issuers to issue securities and access capital
markets than the traditional registration statement.
Shelf
registration registers securities essentially on a transaction basis,
rather than registering the issuer, but moves away from the onetime,
transaction-based
approach
towards
continuous
registration.
Expanded availability of the shelf registration
process allows issuers greater potential to accomplish many of the
objectives, particularly increased flexibility and speed in getting
issues to the market that a company-based registration model
might provide.
Shelf registration allows issuers to register securities on a
continuous or delayed basis. A qualified registrant may register
for the future offering either: (a) the total dollar amount of
securities to be offered, identifying the classes and types of
securities, without specifying the number or dollar amount of any
particular class or type of securities; or (b) the dollar amount of a
particular class or classes of securities without specifying the
exact terms of each offering. In either case, the aggregate amount
of securities registered cannot be more than the issuer reasonably
expects to issue within the next two years.
As a practical matter, although the shelf registration process
is available to all issuers, it is utilized almost exclusively by
larger, seasoned issuers who qualify to register securities on Form
S-3. This is because Form S-3 allows incorporation by reference to
the issuer's 1934 Act filings, allowing the issuer to automatically
update its 1933 Act registration statement when it files a 1934
Act report. Only reporting companies that have made periodic
filings under the 1934 Act for a period of at least one year and
have a minimum public float of seventy-five million dollars may
register securities on Form S-3 for an offering on a delayed
basis. 12° The seasoned issuer's periodic reports filed under the
1934 Act are automatically incorporated by reference into the S-3.
Once declared effective, the registration statement remains
would in large part do away with the advantages of a shelf registration system
for many issuances. See Aircraft Carrier, supra note 3; see also Blackman, supra
note 55.
120 No minimum public float is required if the offering is of non-convertible
investment grade securities.
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available and allows the issuer to offer securities off the shelf by
preparing and filing a prospectus supplement that discloses the
particular terms of the securities and the offering.
As it presently stands, the universal shelf registration system
has a number of advantages over the traditional registration
system. By permitting an issuer to declare its general intent to
issue securities and then take down those securities it wishes to
sell without obtaining further SEC approval, issuers can more
Universal shelf
readily keep pace with today's markets.
registration also allows issuers to take advantage of positive
and type of security
market conditions; they can issue the amount
12 1
time.
particular
on favorable terms for that
Several revisions to the rules governing universal shelf
registration may make it a more effective tool in capital markets,
as they continue to evolve. The Task Force suggested some of
these changes. First, it would be useful to expand the universe of
issuers eligible to use shelf registration. The Task Force report
recommended expansion of shelf registration to permit smaller
companies to utilize universal shelf registration. 1 22 Second,
eliminating the requirement that an issuer may only register
securities it has an intention to sell within a two-year period will
encourage the use of the universal shelf registration system. This
would come closest to the models proposed by the Wallman
Commission and the Aircraft Carrier in that the "event" of the
of
registration statement would be minimized and the importance 123
the disclosure in the 1934 Act reports would be emphasized.
Finally, amending the regulations to require payment only at the
time securities are actually sold will make shelf registration more
attractive. Current regulations require that a fee based on the
Transaction fees can be lower for shelf registrations than traditional
securities registrations. See John Floegel, Equity Financing for Public
Corporations:Reasons and Methods to Encourage It, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1411,
1442-43 (1990). Since the adoption of the universal shelf rules in 1992, the use of
this registration system has increased dramatically. See John F. Olson, et. al.,
Recent Developments in Federal Securities Regulation of Corporate Finance, 1
A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, POSTGRADUATE COURSE IN FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAW SE10 (1999) citing Simplification of Registration Procedures for
Primary Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-6943, 51 SEC
DOCKET (CCH) 1501 (July 16, 1992).
122 See Task Force Report, supranote 41, at 48-49.
123 The Task Force suggested the use of post-effective amendments to amend
a shelf registration to allow the seasoned issuer to add new types or classes of
securities. See id. at 52-53.
121
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total amount of securities to be registered must be paid at the
time of the initial filing of the registration statement. 124 Issuers
thus incur substantial expense whether or not they actually issue
the securities.
B.

Integrationof Offerings: Public to Private and Private to
Public

Section 5 of the 1933 Act requires that every offer and sale of
securities be pursuant to an effective 1933 Act registration
statement or an exemption from registration.
The SEC's
integration doctrine expresses the SEC's general view that where
there are multiple types of offerings made within the same
general time frame, they will be treated as a single offering. This
is in response to the SEC's concern that issuers will attempt to
use a combination of private placement and safe harbor
exemptions to, in effect, avoid registration of what could be
deemed a public offering. 125 Thus, an otherwise exempt private
placement could, if viewed by the SEC as integrated with another
private or public offering, lose its private placement exemption.
Although the SEC has established certain guidelines for
determining whether issuances by the same issuer should be
integrated, 126 the application of these guidelines is not clear or
124 The Task Force also noted this disadvantage to the issuer and
recommended that the SEC adopt a "pay-as-you-go" policy for seasoned issuers.
See Task Force Report, supra note 41, at 54.
125 The SEC has established a safe harbor under Regulation D for private
placements more than six months after a failed public offering. 17 C.F.R. §
230.502(a) (1996). The speed of today's capital markets, however, often makes a
six-month wait highly impracticable.
126 The SEC has set forth a five-factor test for determining whether two
offerings should be integrated. The five factors are "whether (1) the different
offerings are part of a single plan of financing, (2) the offerings involve issuance
of the same class of securities, (3) the offerings are made at or about the same
time, (4) the same type of consideration is to be received, [and] (5) the offerings
are made for the general purpose." Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities
Act Release No. 33-4552, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316 (Nov. 6, 1962). These guidelines,
however, have been described as "subjective" and as providing "little certainty."
William P. Rogers, Jr. & John W. White, The Statutory Arrangement for Public
and Private Securities Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, in SECURITIES
OFFERINGS, supra note 57, at 7, 22. The SEC in a series of no-action letters has
also set forth an exemption from integration in those instances where a private
placement is offered to qualified institutional buyers and a very small number of
institutional accredited investors; such a private placement will not be
integrated with a concurrent public offering. See Black Box Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 79,510, at 77,571 (June 26,
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foolproof.
Extensive analysis is therefore required, and
complicated legal issues need to be resolved, when an issuer
makes a public and private (exempt) offering within the same
approximate time frame.
The SEC should clarify those circumstances that give rise to
the integration of offerings. They should enact regulatory
provisions that expand integration safe harbors. These measures
would reduce the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the
application of the integration concept and the resulting preclusion
127
of issuers from the capital markets.
These types of clarification and expansion have become
particularly important given the present reality that many ecommerce (and other) companies face, with the slowdown in the
capital markets and initial public offerings they have abandoned
planned public offerings after the filing of a registration
statement. These companies must subsequently raise capital
through private offerings and try to determine whether the SEC
will require that subsequent private offerings be integrated with
the abandoned public offering. 28 This type of analysis had
become fraught with uncertainty, given the fact that the SEC did
not provide guidelines until very recently.
In an attempt to provide greater clarity in circumstances
where an issuer has abandoned a planned public offering, the
SEC has adopted Rule 155129 under the 1933 Act. Rule 155
provides a safe harbor for unregistered private offerings that
follow an abandoned registered offering, by not requiring
integration of the two offerings. The new rule also provides a safe
harbor for a registered offering following an abandoned private
1990); Squadron, Ellenoff, Pleasant & Lehrer, SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 313 (Feb. 28, 1992). The "Black Box" exemption, as it is known,
however, is narrow in scope.
127 One of the proposals in the Aircraft Carrier would have expanded the
Rule 152 safe harbor to allow conversion from an abandoned public offering to a
private offering, conversion from an abandoned unregistered private offering to a
registered public offering, and would have set forth the requirements to prevent
integration of a completed unregistered private offering with a subsequent
private offering. See Aircraft Carrier, supranote 3, at 81,556. Rule 155, recently
adopted under the 1933 Act was an adoption, in part, of the Aircraft Carrier's
proposed expansion of Rule 152.
128 See Stanley Keller, What Can We Do Now That Our Public Offering Has
Aborted?, INSIGHTS, July, 2000, at 3.
129 17 C.F.R. § 230.155 (2001). Rule 155 became effective March 7, 2001. See
id.
The adopting release is posted on the SEC's website at
httpv/www.sec.gov/rules/ final/33-7943.htm [hereinafter Adopting Release].
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offering. Under this rule, if an issuer commences a registered
offering but sells no securities, e.g., the registration statement has
not yet become effective, it may withdraw the registration
statement and begin a private offering after meeting certain
conditions. For example, the issuer must observe a thirty-day
waiting period, after the effective date of withdrawal of the
registration statement, before it begins the private offering.30
Although Rule 155 provides this safe harbor, and thus, to
some extent, alleviates uncertainty for issuers who must abandon
a registered or private (exempt) offering and use an alternative
method of raising capital, it does not clarify the SEC's guidelines
for determining when an issuer's completed offerings will be
considered integrated. 13 1 As noted above, extensive legal analysis
is required in these circumstances. The safe harbors of Rule 155
have not changed the need for extensive legal analysis or its
attendant uncertainty.
The participants in today's capital
markets need clearer SEC guidance under these circumstances.
C.

Increase in the Use of the Internet to FacilitateOfferings

The Internet has already had a significant impact on the
operation of the capital markets and it will surely become
increasingly important in the near and long-term future. The
SEC has publicly stated its intent to issue rules and proposals to
130 In addition, the issuer must provide the offerees in the private offering
with certain disclosures about the withdrawal of the registration statement and
other matters. 17 C.F.R. § 230.155(c) (2001). If an issuer wishes to commence a
registered offering after abandoning a private offering in which no securities
were sold, it may rely on the safe harbor and begin the process of commencing
the registered offering if it terminates the private offering and provides certain
disclosures in the registration statement. The issuer will also have to wait thirty
days after abandoning the private offering before filing the registration
statement, unless securities in the private offering were offered only to persons
who were, or who the issuer reasonably believed were, either "accredited
investors" or "sophisticated," as defined under the rules of the 1933 Act and by
the SEC. In addition, the original private offering must have met the
requirements to constitute a bona fide private offering. 17 C.F.R. § 230.155(b)
(2001).
131 See supra note 122 and accompanying text (noting the impracticability of
the present six-month waiting period under Regulation D to ensure that a
subsequent private placement is not integrated with a previous registered
offering); supra note 123 and accompanying text (noting the difficulties of
applying the five-factor test for determining whether offerings that are less than
six months apart will be considered integrated). The SEC noted in its adopting
release for Rule 155 that the new rule did not modify the five-factor test.
Adopting Release, supra note 127, at 3.
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address the issues relating to electronic delivery requirements
and the meaning of written offers as applied to electronic
communication, and has also issued guidelines regulating the
conduct and implementation of electronic road shows. 132 SEC
enforcement is likely to expand in scope to match developing
technologies and the growing prevalence of Internet-based
securities fraud.
The changes brought about by the Internet are, and will most
likely continue to be, infrastructure related rather than
substantive changes to the securities regulation regime. If the
SEC is able to effectively tailor its guidelines to significant
technological advances, then it could potentially implement
sweeping changes in the process of capital formation. An example
would be increased market accessibility by smaller companies,
previously locked out because of the high costs of offerings and
road shows, but now fully enfranchised as a result of relaxed
restrictions on electronic delivery and Internet road shows. 133
While it is unlikely that, in the near future, paper documents
will be completely eliminated in favor of purely electronic
offerings, it seems clear that the SEC will continue to take steps
to facilitate the use of new technologies in the offering process.
This will accelerate the time frame of offerings and allow smaller
companies and non-institutional investors, who had previously
been locked out of the capital markets, unprecedented access to
information through the use of recent technological advances.
D.

The Integrationof Global SecuritiesRegimes Should Result in
Adjustment by the SEC of Some DisclosureStandards

While a uniform global securities regime is still far off, the
advantages of such a system for companies trying to effectuate
cross-border financings are apparent. To date, the SEC has tried
to take a leadership role in paving the way for a uniform set of
international securities laws, and will presumably continue to do

132

See Electronic Delivery of Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 34-

44133

18134, at 18135 (March 29, 2001) (proposing amendments for electronic

delivery).
133 Cf George Ponds Kobler, Shareholder Voting Over the Internet: A
Proposal for IncreasingShareholder Participationin Corporate Governance, 49

ALA. L. REV. 673, 694 (1998) (noting the argument that increased access to
information on the Internet levels the playing field between smaller and larger
investors).
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so. 1 34 In the future, it is likely that more countries will develop
135
"full faith and credit" systems.
The U.S. securities regime is regarded by many other
countries as unduly invasive and burdensome. 136 As a result, the
SEC has made significant advances to facilitate the use of the
137
U.S. capital markets by issuers from less regulated countries.
These advances are likely to continue and may include the
relaxation of disclosure requirements and acceptance of disclosure
materials acceptable under other systems.
CONCLUSION
Since their adoption, the Securities Acts have served the U.S.
capital markets well. The facts and circumstances surrounding
the Securities Acts, however, have changed significantly. While
the fundamental need for the protection of investors has not
changed, the rapid and significant developments in the capital
markets may have made the basic structure of the Securities Acts,
and particularly the 1933 Act, overly cumbersome, if not obsolete.
If the U.S. securities markets are to retain their pre-eminent
position in the global financial community, methods must be
found to modify provisions of the Securities Acts to respond to the
current status of the marketplace.
While a fundamental
legislative revamping may be ideal, it is more likely that change
will be achieved through significant regulatory revisions that
adapt the original legislative scheme to the flux of modern capital
markets.

134 See Kellye Y. Testy, Comity and Cooperation:Securities Regulations in a
GlobalMarketplace, 45 ALA. L. REV. 927, 938 (1994) (discussing the SEC's efforts
to reach its goal of a global market system).
135 See id. at 949.
136 See id. at 933, 939, 957.
137 See id. at 942.

